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Abstract  
We argue that direct active teaching in humans exhibits at least two properties 
(open-endedness and content opacity) that make the recognition of teaching 
episodes without ostension untenable. Thus, while we welcome Kline’s 
functional approach to the analysis of teaching, we think that she ignores 
important features of the socio-environmental niche in which human teaching 
likely evolved. 
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Main text  
We applaud Kline’s explicitly functionalist approach to the topic of teaching. 
While somewhat reminiscent of the model proposed by Hoppitt et al. (2008), 
the classification of the types of teaching that Kline charts out in the present 
paper is primarily dependent on the range of adaptive problems that social 
learners may face. This allows the author to discuss the design features that 
each teaching type exhibits in terms of the adaptive problem that it 
purportedly evolved to solve (e.g., limited motivation to attend to relevant 
information). A rigorous application of this genuinely Darwinian approach 
could indeed bridge the study of the taxonomical distribution of teaching 
behaviors and that of the socio-environmental niches where particular types 
of teaching are observed and likely evolved.  
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We think, however, that Kline’s characterization of ‘direct active 
teaching’ (DAT) in humans may fall short of adequately describing the 
mutual evolutionary dependency between species-typical psychology and 
adaptive niche that her framework rightly champions. As Kline notes, DAT 
“does not require ostensive cues (at least by definition)” – in other words, it 
does not require the teacher to explicitly mark her demonstration as a 
teaching attempt, addressed to specific a pupil. This could indeed be the case 
when there is some “shared background knowledge” that the pupil could rely 
on to interpret the teacher’s demonstration as communicating to-be-learned 
information. Articulating Kline’s intuition, one could imagine such 
background knowledge as consisting of species-typical sensitivity to fitness-
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relevant action outcomes, in which the causal relations the pupil is unable to 
entertain and appropriately reconstruct via asocial learning mechanisms. 
Alternatively, this background knowledge could also be established by 
explicit linguistic communication, e.g., by informing the putative pupil that a 
subsequent demonstration would constitute a teaching episode. In either case, 
the function of DAT could be potentially realized without the need of 
ostensive communication. Tellingly, however, these hypothetical scenarios 
could dispense with ostension only by assuming (in the first case) that the set 
of fitness-relevant information that a given species needs to acquire is narrow 
in scope and fixed in content; or, alternatively, (in the second case) that the 
pupil’s expectations could complement the pedagogical stance of the teacher 
only if both parties are capable of linguistic communication. Neither of these 
trade-offs seems to constrain DAT in humans: the domain of teaching is 
clearly open-ended, and its receptivity, as a large volume of developmental 
evidence shows, well predates the understanding of language. How could 
this be? 
!
Klein is keenly aware of the learnability challenge that this open-endedness 
poses: “the pupil has no way to solve the ‘frame problem’ by observing 
others’ behavior” and “Her only indication that information is relevant comes 
from the teacher.” Thus, given that DAT is fundamentally characterized by 
“(a) manifestation of relevant information by the teacher to the pupil, and (b) 
interpretation of this manifestation in terms of knowledge content by the 
pupil,” and that — at least in humans — the second condition could not be 
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satisfied by simply recovering pedagogical intentions from the (perceived) 
fitness relevance of the demonstrator’s behavior, something else is required.   
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As argued elsewhere (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; 2011), a candidate solution to 
this problem is ostensive communication. The design features that ostension 
exhibits — in terms of the cognitive effects it produces in the pupil — in fact 
tailored to solve the problem of communicating about the occurrence of 
relevant, to-be-learned knowledge content. Rather than merely attracting the 
attention of the pupil towards certain objects, actions, or locations, together 
with making manifest to the pupil that she is the intended addressee of the 
demonstration, ostension restructures the relevance assumptions governing 
the pupil’s learning in more fundamental ways. It allows the pupil to acquire 
the content of a culturally transmitted behavior that may to a large extent 
remain cognitively opaque in terms of its underlying causal and teleological 
structure. Similarly to epistemic deference (Gergely & Jacob, 2013; Sperber, 
1997), ostension allows for the acquisition of (generic) knowledge contents 
that are not only functionally non-transparent, but that do not seem to have 
any perceivable fitness value. This prima facie puzzling susceptibility, which 
clashes against a cognitive economy rarely prioritizing the encoding of 
opaque information in non-communicative contexts, is revelatory of the type 
of evolutionary challenge that favored the selection of this mechanism. 
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As Kline writes, “our species depends to a great degree on cumulative 
cultural adaptations too complex for any one individual to create on his or her 
own.” Our fundamental reliance on opaque (material and social) kinds cries 
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out for an explanation of how human cognition succeeded in stabilizing the 
transmission of cultural items such as artifacts and conventions, which are 
opaque through and through. This unprecedented evolutionary challenge was 
partly overcome, we believe, by evolving cognitive adaptations that would 
allow for the interpretation of communicated information as being applicable 
beyond its local and episodic use. This is precisely the type of inference that 
ostensive signals license about demonstrated content. Therefore, if human 
teaching is to be portrayed as a glaring exception in the animal kingdom, this 
is not, or not solely, because of its frequency and breadth of use, but rather 
because of its capacity to perpetuate cultural kinds that are causally and 
teleologically opaque. To emphasize this aspect is to highlight the 
irreplaceable role that ostension plays in DAT for humans.  
!
Thus, while endorsing and strongly encouraging the application of the 
framework that Kline laid out, we also think that more weight should be 
assigned to ostensively grounded teaching. This, if anything, could only 
enrich Kline’s functionalist agenda by adding a further adaptive problem — 
learning in and about, and in spite of, a culturally opaque environment — to 
her articulated classification, while doing proper justice to the idea of 
“cultural niche” (Boyd et al., 2011).  
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